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SYMPOSIUM ON ANTITRUST LAW
AND ECONOMICS
INTRODUCTION
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSONt

The articles appearing in this issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review were originally presented at a conference on
Antitrust Law and Economics held at the University of Pennsylvania in November 1978.1 Inasmuch as antitrust is a highly interdisciplinary undertaking, it is unsurprising that the participants at
such a conference and the content of the papers join law and economics in a thoroughly interdisciplinary way.
Although the conference was not specifically organized to feature efficiency analysis, the strengths and weaknesses of that approach play a large role in most of the papers and surfaced as the
recurring theme of the oral discussions. This would surely not
have been true of a similar conference organized in the 1960's.
Still, although there is a greater appreciation for, and reliance upon,
efficiency analysis in antitrust than existed a decade ago, significant
differences remain.
Major points of contention include: (1) the weight that is to be
assigned to efficiency in relation to other values, (2) the factors
that are mainly responsible for efficiency gains, and (3) the
circumstances under which anticompetitive hazards appear. The
political content of antitrust is germane to the first of these questions and is addressed in several of the papers. Whereas efficiency
gains were mainly described in technological terms a decade ago,
transaction-cost economies are now recognized as the driving force
behind many changes in economic organization. Probably the
principal issue on which the conference participants divide is the
matter of strategic behavior-efforts by established firms to take up
advance positions and/or respond contingently to rivalry in ways
that discipline actual, and discourage potential, competition.
Whether such behavior exists, what forms it takes, how widespread
each type is, and what antitrust ramifications attach thereto, are all
open to dispute.
f Charles and William L. Day Professor of Economics and Social Sciences,
University of Pennsylvania.

,The conference was held under the auspices of the Center for the Study of
Organizational Innovation of the University of Pennsylvania.
(918)

1979]

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION

Thus, although this conference celebrates an evolving consensus that microeconomic analysis, with special emphasis on efficiency, is central to the study of antitrust-an outcome that was
highly problematic a decade ago, it also discloses that there are
important unresolved issues on the research agenda. If a similar
conference is organized six to ten years from now, one would hope
that considerable progress will have been made in the effort to
reach a consensus on the matters of strategic behavior that this
conference serves to identify, but scarcely settles.
So much for an overview. Consider now the specific papers
that were given at the conference and which appear in this issue.
By design, the conference features different approaches to antitrust
law and economics issues. Professor Posner's paper focuses mainly
on differences between the Chicago School, with which he is prominently associated, and the Harvard School. He traces the origins
of a distinctive Chicago approach to Aaron Director and his students
and colleagues. What mainly distinguished the Chicago from the
Harvard approach to antitrust was Director's insistence that antitrust issues be studied "through the lens of price theory." 2 The
classic example used for contrasting Chicago with Harvard is that
of tie-ins. Whereas Chicago explained the tie-in in terms of price
discrimination (the main purpose of the tie-in being to serve as a
metering device), Harvard subscribed instead to a "leverage" theory.
Albeit intriguing, and even plausible, the latter has since been discredited.
More generally, Chicago has resisted the reliance upon entrybarrier arguments that is a prominent feature of the Harvard
tradition. The strong version of the Chicago position asserts that
meaningful entry barriers do not exist-a viewpoint that goes beyond
what most students of antitrust law and economics are prepared to
accept. Although many scholars would concede that entry-barrier
arguments have been overused and sometimes reflect a failure to
recognize merit outcomes (the realization that a meaningful barrier does not exist if a superior outcome is unattainable), few would
agree that conditions of entry, and the possibility that firms engage
in activities designed to influence those conditions, ought to be
excluded from antitrust consideration.
Intertemporal analysis of barriers to entry squarely raises the
matter of strategic behavior. As Posner acknowledges, strategic
behavior is not a concept that Chicago has been at ease with. Cer2
See Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. RBv.
925 (1979).
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tain issues, however-of which predatory pricing is one--cannot be
accurately assessed without reference to strategic objectives. "Diehard" and other Chicagoans differ mainly over the role that each is
prepared to assign to strategic behavior.
Vertical market restrictions are examined from a transactioncost point of view in my paper. The transaction, rather than the
firm or the industry, is made the basic unit of analysis. Attention
is riveted on alternative modes of organizing transactions, with the
objective of assessing their respective capacities to economize on
transaction costs. This approach scrutinizes the incentive, adaptive,
and contractual expense properties of alternative governance structures. The rebuttable presumption that new modes of organization are designed to economize on transaction costs is maintained.
This approach to the study of economic organization may be
contrasted with the earlier "inhospitability tradition," which attributed anticompetitive purpose and effect to novel or nontraditional modes of economic organization. The latter approach to the
study of vertical restrictions prevailed at the time that United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 3 was argued and decided. That the
efficiency presumptions associated with the transaction-cost approach
provide a sounder basis for antitrust enforcement in this area is
reflected in later scholarship and in the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc.4
Inasmuch as vertical restrictions can have strategic anticompetitive effects if certain structural preconditions (of a monopoly,
dominant firm, or tight oligopoly kind) are satisfied, efficiency presumptions can be successfully rebutted. As my paper demonstrates,
the antitrust significance of the entry impediments associated with
vertical restrictions also turns on transaction costs. Thus, although
the phenomena of interest differ, the transaction-cost approach
provides a symmetrical framework for the evaluation of vertical
restrictions. The approach is relevant to the determination of
whether non-trivial transaction-cost savings are attributable to particular vertical restraints and is equally applicable to analysis of
the strategic aspects of such restrictions. In summary, the proposed legal principles with which the paper concludes make allowance for both the efficiency and strategic aspects of a given transaction.

3388 U.S. 365 (1967).
4433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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Professor Schmalensee's paper examines the economics of the
Federal Trade Commission's Intial Decision in Borden, Inc.5 and
points to the need for more sophisticated economic analysis than
rudimentary models commonly provide. The distinction between
ordinary, garden variety antitrust cases and those which pose novel
issues is relevant in this connection. Although "detailed mastery
of economic refinements" 6 may be unnecessary in the former cases,
greater sophistication may be essential to an adequate analysis of
the latter set of situations. As Professor Schmalensee states,
When substitution relations are such that there is no object
that corresponds well to the classical concept of a market,
when buyers and sellers lack important information, or
when product differentiation of one form or another is important, however, there is at least a presumption that
market behavior may not be well explained by standard
models.

7

The Schmalensee paper examines the question whether Borden's
attempts to recover lost market share in the market for reconstituted
lemon juice should be characterized as predatory conduct. In answering that question, Professor Schmalensee explores the utility of
standard predatory-pricing models and market-definition criteria
in the evaluation of Borden's behavior. He concludes that extant
pricing models and conventional market-share measures are poorly
suited to deal with differentiated product markets. Rather than
become engrossed in efforts to devise refined market-share measures,
Schmalensee instead counsels that attention should be focused on
whether the purported predator enjoyed monopoly advantage and
hence had an incentive to engage in predation. He contends that
persistent excess profits establish a presumption of monopoly power
such that dominant firms would have something to lose if rivalry
intensified. Inasmuch, however, as all firms, monopolistic and
otherwise, have something to lose from more intensive rivalry,
Schmalensee presumably is arguing that dominant firms are better
able to appropriate the gains of reduced rivalry.
Commissioner Pitofsky, in a paper prepared prior to his service
on the Federal Trade Commission, examines the political content
5 (Initial Decision), No. 8978 (Aug. 19, 1976), reported in [1976] 3

TRADE

BEG. BEP. (CCH) 121,194, modified, Borden, Inc. (Opinion of the Comnm'n), No.
8978 (Nov. 7, 1978), reported in TRADE BEG. REP. (CCH) Adv. Sh. No. 361 at 8

(Nov. 27, 1978).
6 Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon

Case, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 994, 996 (1979).
"Id. 997.
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of antitrust. He argues that it is "bad history, bad policy, and bad
law to exclude certain non-economic considerations" s from the
enforcement of antitrust. The goal of dispersed power is one that
Americans value in both public and private sectors. This is evident
from a review of the legislative history of various antitrust enactments, the amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act 9 being the
most recent example. Pitofsky further explores the political content of antitrust law by contemplating the reaction that would attend hypothetical mergers involving, for example, General Motors
and IBM.
The mere existence of non-economic values does not, however,
establish that such values are determinative of antitrust policy. Commissioner Pitofsky counsels against protecting small businessmen
from the rigors of competition, protecting distributors regardless of efficiency, and using antitrust to promote income-redistribution goals. Rather, he argues that the goal of antitrust is to preserve a competitive process and that such a process orientation will
afford adequate protection to small businesses against unfair or
punitive practices by much larger firms.
The purported tension between economic and political goals
thus shrinks substantially when the political purposes of antitrust are appropriately delimited and the limits of efficiency analysis
are acknowledged and respected. As Commissioner Pitofsky states,
"Elimination or containment of monopoly, elimination of unnecessary barriers to entry, and unreasonable business practices not only
promote economic efficiency but tend to avoid undue concentrations
of economic power." 10 Still, tensions remain. Lest antitrust resources be dissipated, greater effort is needed to distinguish those
cases in which the political content is especially great from those in
which efficiency considerations mainly govern.
Professors Areeda and Turner examine claims of extended interdependence and effects on interindustry competition as grounds
for condemning conglomerate mergers. They eschew "possibility"
analysis in favor of a more meaningful scrutiny of the probable
effects on competition. They accordingly define a set of minimum
conditions that must be satisfied before extended interdependence
can be considered worrisome. Included among these are: (1) the
merged firm and at least one rival must confront each other in at
8 Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.

REv. 1051, 1051

(1979).
9 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
§ 201, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976)). See Pitofsky, supra
note 9, at 1060-65.
1o Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 1066.

SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION

1979]

least two oligopolistic markets; (2) the merged firm and at least one
other two-market firm must be significant in both markets; and
(3) the merger must create a retaliation interdependency not previously present.
The potential for anticompetitive effects through the attenuation of interindustry competition between products such as petroleum and coal also comes under scrutiny in the paper. Whereas
Commissioner Pitofsky evidently regards mergers between leading
petroleum and leading coal companies as troublesome, Areeda and
Turner argue that as long as the coal industry is competitively
structured, no merged, two-product (coal and oil) firm can have
discretionary power over coal prices. More generally, Areeda and
Turner contend that interindustry mergers can have substantial
anticompetitive effects only under very special and highly unlikely
circumstances-where both industries are non-competitive, and the
merging firms are dominant firms with similar interests in both
markets. Accordingly, if public policy is to resist conglomerate
mergers, Areeda and Turner would counsel that attention be focused on factors other than extended interdependence and interindustry competition effects.
Professor Weiss is a leading contributor to the structure-conduct-performance tradition of antitrust analysis. This is the approach that provided much of the economic underpinning for the
older Harvard School tradition to which Posner refers. Despite
shifts of interest and modes of analysis, it remains a vibrant tradition-with special emphasis on empirical analysis.
Many of the empirical issues relating to this tradition were
examined at an antitrust law and economics conference held in
March 1974.11 Professor Weiss summarizes some of this background
and reports on more recent studies that bear on the concentrationprofitability controversy. He also contrasts the views of Professors
Stigler and Bain on the antitrust significance of entry barriers.
Weiss favors the Bain position and inquires, incredulously, whether
anyone can doubt that entry into an industry is prohibitively difficult "where there is only enough room to support one efficient
firm." 12

Many antitrust scholars would argue, however, that the critical
question for public-policy purposes is whether there are remediable
i

The proceedings of this conference are reported in

TION: THE NEw LEARnnx

INLUSTRTAL CoNicrm4Rr(H.J. Goldshmid, H.M. Mann, & J.F. Weston eds. 1974).

12 Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-PerformanceParadigm and Antitrust, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 1104 (1979).
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barriers to entry. If, as is commonly the case, the more efficient
of two technologies yields net social benefits, what useful purpose
is served by characterizing this more efficient technology in entrybarrier terms? More instructive, presumably, would be an effort
to focus on entry impediments the removal of which would not
sacrifice valued economies of scale. The possibilities that history
matters in the evolution of an industry, that unassisted market
processes will not reliably undo evolved dominant-firm outcomes
within a reasonable time period, and that strategic behavior is a
significant concern all come under scrutiny when the issue is put
in these terms. Attention to process'13 and transaction-cost factors
arise in this way. Professor Weiss's remarks on the IBM case are
in the spirit of these more microanalytic modes of investigation.
The upshot of this conference is that antitrust law and economics has come a long way in the past decade. Whereas antitrust
enforcement policy in the 1960's was skeptical of, and sometimes
hostile to, economies other than those realized by internal expansion, efficiency outcomes of all kinds are valued without apology
today. Likewise, vertical market restrictions and other unfamiliar
business practices were regarded with suspicion during the 1960's.
By contrast, the possibility that nonstandard practices are driven
by transaction-cost economies is widely conceded today. And
whereas much antitrust argument was uninformed by rudimentary
price theory in the 1960's, the role of microeconomics in antitrust
is now securely established.
Despite these developments, antitrust law and economics is
not apt to settle for the quiet life. Analytical convergence notwithstanding, a number of lively, unresolved issues remain. Among
the leading issues are: (1) public policy toward conglomerates; (2)
public policy toward dominant firms; (3) the incidence and ramifications of strategic behavior; and (4) the need for greater economic
and legal sophistication in dealing with differentiated product industries.
Thus, although antitrust law and economics has made great
progress during the past decade, the research agenda for the future
is crowded, and the outcome is uncertain. Considering, however,
the variety and quality of the new talents that are being brought to
bear on these issues, the prospects for significant advances in antitrust law and economics research are distinctly promising.
13 For a recent and important discussion of the implications of various models
of entry on concentration, see Nelson & Winter, Forces Generating and Limiting

ConcentrationUnder Schumpeterian Competition, 9 BF-T-T J. EcoN. 524, 543 (1978).

